PART ONE:
GAZA PANICS AS SINAI BLOODSHED SEVERS TUNNEL TRADE
By Adel Zaanoun
August 8, 2012
Rafah,
Palestinian
Territories
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"If this
closure continues it will be a disaster," says Abu Taha, who runs one of
hundreds of cross-border smuggling tunnels that were closed after a deadly
attack in the Sinai.
For the
40-year-old businessman, the tunnels burrowed deep under Gaza's southern border
with Egypt have provided him and thousands of others with a steady and
lucrative source of income over the years.
But it all come to a grinding halt on Sunday night after a group of more than 30 gunmen dressed as Bedouin stormed a nearby Egyptian border police post in northern Sinai, killing 16 of them before storming the border with Israel.
The brutal attack prompted shock in Cairo, which quickly closed the Rafah border and blocked access to the smuggling tunnels, abruptly cutting off a lifeline for Gaza which has been subjected to an Israeli blockade since 2006.
"Merchandise and foodstuffs come through the tunnels, and building activities will completely stop," Abu Taha told AFP.
"Closing the tunnels will strangle Gaza and make Israel happy."
News of the closure was like a "bombshell," says Abu Mustafa, 34, who owns a tunnel specializing in building materials.
"Our business will grind to a halt. It will hurt thousands of families of both tunnel owners and workers," he says soberly.
"We are not against any Egyptian or Palestinian security measures, but we demand they reopen the tunnels, maybe with a bit more scrutiny. But if we close the tunnels, people in Gaza will die."
Palestinian security officials estimate there are hundreds of tunnels in Rafah, a sprawling city which straddles the border between southern Gaza and the Egyptian Sinai..
Omar Shaaban, an economist who heads PALThink, a Gaza-based think tank, says tunnel trade is worth an estimated half a billion dollars a year. Closing them, he says, will have a "devastating effect on all walks of life in Gaza.
"The strip got used to the tunnels as a permanent crossing point, and every sector is completely dependent on them," he tells AFP.
"Closure even for only a week will cause a serious deterioration in the situation."
Gaza has been under Israeli blockade since 2006. Although steps have been taken to ease the restrictions, Israel still maintains tight controls on what can be imported, including many basic construction materials -- which are brought in by tunnel, Shaaban says.
Closing the tunnels will mean many building projects will be stopped, which will "put 15,000 workers in the building sector out of work."
"And don't forget that fuel comes in every day, and delaying this will worsen the electricity crisis and will stop work at bakeries, in factories and in transportation."
Until very recently, Gaza had been living through its worst power crisis in living memory, but the situation had eased considerably with the delivery of millions of gallons of Qatari fuel through Egypt and Israel.
But Sunday night's attack has put everything on hold.
Long lines of cars could be seen outside petrol stations across the coastal enclave on Monday as panic buying kicked in, with many outlets running dry.
"The Egyptians are blocking trucks carrying goods and fuel from reaching the tunnels," says Abu Jihad, who runs a fuel tunnel.
Although he agreed that Egypt needed to act to catch the perpetrators, Abu Jihad said closing the tunnels would hit Gaza very hard.
"Who will provide food and drink for the people here? How will the power plant function without fuel? Life here depends on tunnels."
Within hours of the raid, which saw 35 gunmen storm the Egyptian post then crash two vehicles over the border near Israel's Kerem Shalom crossing, Hamas police went on high alert, reinforcing its numbers along the frontier to keep people away.
Ihab al-Ghussein, spokesman for the Hamas-run interior ministry, says the state of alert will continue "for as long as necessary" to ensure no perpetrators try to flee into Gaza.
The attackers, he says, were not from Gaza.
"Gaza had nothing to do with the attack and no one from Gaza sneaked out through the tunnels," he insists, rejecting "baseless accusations" implicating Palestinians, which he describes as "the Israeli narrative."
Deputy foreign minister Ghazi Hamad told AFP the Rafah crossing could be reopened "in the next few days if it is proven that no one in Gaza was involved in the attack, but I think tunnels will take some time.
"We closed the tunnels to prevent anyone from sneaking in or out of Gaza during the pursuit of the offenders and those who backed them."
Closing the tunnels, he admits, "affects the strip negatively as everybody knows Gaza depends on tunnels to get food, construction materials like cement, and fuel."
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(Credit: Reuters//Ibraheem Abu Mustafa)
PART TWO:
SMUGGLERS’ TUNNELS ARE HAMAS’ LIFEBLOOD
The subterranean politics of war and peace in Gaza
By Matt Duss
February 27,
2012
H, Gaza Strip ~ The first things you notice are the trucks,
entering Rafah’s dusty main thoroughfare from small side streets, flatbeds
fully loaded and covered. Then there are the young boys packed three to a
motorbike, darting heedlessly in between the rumbling behemoths, clutching
shovels. As you get closer, you see the enormous mounds of earth and rubble,
some 10 feet high and more, set amid acres of makeshift canopies, tents and
metal garages, which serve as loading docks for Rafah’s booming tunnel trade.
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This underground entrepot is now another front in the
multifaceted Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After years of virtual ~ and
sometimes actual ~ civil war, the Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah have gotten
more serious about reconciling and forming a united front, ostensibly to better
achieve Palestinian national goals, more immediately to stem growing popular
discontent at the abject failure of either party to do so.
Yet the unity talks have also exposed a division between
Hamas’ external leadership, represented by Khaled Meshaal, and the Gaza-based
leadership, represented by current Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh. When
Meshal and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah announced the outlines
of a deal (one that would make Abbas both president and prime minister of a
unity government) in Qatar earlier this month, the Hamas leadership in
Gaza strongly criticized it, saying they hadn’t been sufficiently consulted.
While tensions between the various factions within Hamas
have long been rumored, until now the organization has been fairly good at
managing such tensions in private. What explains the Gaza wing’s decision to so
publicly disagree with its external leadership?
The Rafah tunnel trade ~ and the considerable amount of
revenue (estimates range as high as $20 million per month) that the Gaza Hamas
wing derives from it ~ offers a clue as to why.
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HOW THE TUNNELS GREW
The Rafah tunnels have an ancient heritage. Mentioned
in official documents as far back as 1303 BC, Rafah was an important trading
center for centuries, serving as an entryway between North Africa and the
Levant.
After falling into decline in the Ottoman era, the town
swelled in size with the influx of refugees fleeing from the war between Israel
and the Arab states in 1948, after which Gaza was occupied by Egypt. After the
1967 war, the Gaza Strip came under Israeli control.
The town was divided between Egypt and Israel in the Camp
David Accord, which created a buffer zone between Egypt and Israeli-controlled
Gaza known as the “Philadelphi corridor,” and the tunnels soon began to spring
up, primarily for the transfer of drugs and other contraband, but also for
other goods not easily available under Israeli occupation.
With the coming of the Second Intifada in 2000, the tunnels
increasingly began to be used by violent factions like Hamas and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad to smuggle weapons and explosives for attacks on Israeli
civilians, a problem Israel attempted to deal with by destroying homes and
buildings suspected of covering tunnels.
In 2003, American activist Rachel Corrie was killed by an
Israeli bulldozer as she attempted to prevent it from demolishing a Palestinian
house in Rafah.
Following Israel’s 2005 withdrawal of its settlements from
Gaza, which is home to 1.7 million Palestinians, the Rafah crossing came under
the control of the Palestinian Authority, though according to both the United Nations and the U.S. State
Department, Israel retains responsibilities as an occupying power. In response
to Hamas’ 2006 capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, Israel enacted a strict
closure on Gaza.
In 2007, Hamas took over Gaza in a short but extremely
violent war with its rival, the secular nationalist Fatah, which continues to
rule in the West Bank. Israel tightened its closure even more, allowing the
entry only of goods “vital for the survival of the civilian population,”
banning exports, and prohibiting Palestinians themselves from leaving the Gaza
Strip in all but the most exceptional cases. In response, the tunnel business
took off.
Under Hosni Mubarak, Egypt helped enforce the official
blockade on Gaza, periodically cracking down on the tunnels, which invariably
sprang back up.
In May 2011, after the fall of Mubarak, in an effort to
placate popular opinion, the Egypt’s transitional military government opened the Rafah crossing to Palestinians. It remains
closed to materials.
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“Egypt is OK with it,” said Taghreed El-Khodary, a
Gaza-based journalist and former New York Times correspondent. “They can’t push
too hard, even during Mubarak’s time they couldn’t push too hard during the
siege, and they are making money from it.”
“Prior to 2007, the tunnels functioned to smuggle contraband
into Gaza, cash, weapons, and drugs,” said Sari Bashi, the executive director
for Gisha, an Israeli
human rights group that advocates for the freedom of movement of Gaza’s
residents.
“The tunnels were defined as a security issue, and Israel
cracked down with little success. Beginning in 2007, Israel began restricting
civilian goods, and the response was flourishing of the tunnels, on which
civilians in Gaza now depend.” (In a recent report,
“Scale of Control,” Gisha argued in favor of Israel’s continuing responsibility
for Gaza, based on the considerable extent of Israel’s continued control of the
lives of its residents.)
Based on what I’d seen reported on the tunnels before, I was
expecting to see camouflaged holes in the ground guarded by guys with guns.
While those smaller ones continue to exist (“There are tunnels even Hamas
doesn’t know about,” one observer told me), the ones I saw were housed under
tents and garages, out in the open, with trucks backing right up to them to
load. The tunnels varied in size.
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.
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One was a tight space reminiscent of “The Great Escape,”
reinforced with scrounged plywood and not big enough to stand up in, while
another had walls and ceiling reinforced with steel beams and concrete,
thoughtfully decorated here and there with artificial leaves. Both used truck
engine-powered pulley systems to draw sleds-full of materials the few
kilometers from Egypt. Rumor has it that some tunnels are even big enough to
bring cars through, and have done so.
For something that is thoroughly illegal, I was surprised at
the openness of the activity. A proud worker even invited me to snap a photo of
the tunnel he was currently digging. One doesn’t commit this much time, energy
and resources to such an enterprise if one isn’t reasonably sure about the
safety of such investment. The tunnels now represent the cutting edge of
entrepreneurship in Gaza. There are estimated to be over 1,000 of them
operating now in Rafah.
“The policy of civilian restrictions is what has made the
tunnels basically impossible to close,” said Bashi.
The tunnels also provided a source of tax revenue for the
Hamas government.
“Israel banned construction materials, so the Hamas
government has been bringing them in through tunnels and levying taxes and
operating fees. Prior to the ban the [Ramallah-based] Palestinian Authority was
benefiting from the taxes, and the providers were Israeli and Palestinian
business people.”
Now, she said, that money goes to Hamas. “Israel, through
its restrictions, has created a flourishing black market economy, and a new
class of entrepreneurs, at the expense of the Gaza’s traditional business
community.”
A couple of Gaza businessmen with whom I spoke confirmed
this.
“I want to do business with my friend at General Electric in
Tel Aviv,” not with the “gangsters” who run the tunnels, said one. Another, an
Internet technology entrepreneur, noted that a Dell laptop computer was far
cheaper from the tunnels than bought legally through the Israeli-controlled
Kerem Shalom crossing, which put him in a tough spot as someone trying to run a
business both legally and profitably.
“Once you have a tunnel you have to pay fees, and that goes to the municipality, which provides you electricity” for the tunnel, said El-Khodary. “Then you pay taxes on the goods you bring out. Whether it’s oranges or cement, Hamas gets its tax.”
The continuing closure combined with the tunnel economy puts
Hamas in a comfortable spot: They can blame the continuing Israeli blockade for
their own failures of governance, while using the tunnel revenue to distribute
patronage and maintain favor with key constituencies in the Gaza Strip.
EGYPT LOOKS THE OTHER WAY
On the Egyptian side of the border, there’s no apparent
enthusiasm for cracking down on the tunnels trade.
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“There’s little Army presence, much of this area is
Bedouin controlled, and it’s pretty much isolated from the central government
in Cairo,” said El-Khodary.
“Many Egyptians in Rafah will talk about how isolated they
are, but if you go to El Arish,” a coastal city about 50 kilometers west of
Rafah, “you see people making a hell of a lot of money out of the tunnels.
There’s no way they’re going to let them go.”
Israel’s security concerns over threats emanating from Gaza
are quite legitimate. Materials smuggled through the tunnels have been used to
manufacture rockets and mortars launched against towns in Israel like nearby
Sderot, and there are fears that the range of these weapons is increasing.
The result of the policy of closure, however, has been the development of a sizable black market economy based upon illegal tunnel trade. This has been accompanied by the growth of influential constituencies in both Egypt and Gaza that oppose any effort to shut down the tunnels, and will lobby hard against the creation of a more open, regulated border.
By empowering a large new merchant class that profits from
the tunnels, the closure policy has effectively created another stumbling block
to normalization of relations between Israel and the Palestinians.
To repeat, the tunnels have also created a welcome source of
tax revenue for the Hamas-controlled Gaza government that has both helped them
to resist the impact of the closure and empowered them to challenge their external
leadership when it commits to things they don’t agree with.
Hamas’ external leadership is in a more accommodating
mood. In reaction to Bashar al-Assad’s brutal crackdown, they have
left Damascus, and are looking for a new home and new patrons.
The Gaza leadership, on the other hand, feels more secure.
Having borne the brunt of the Israel’s operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009,
and feeling the wind of the Arab awakening at their back, they also seem to
feel far more justified in asserting themselves against such accommodation. And
skimming the cream off the tunnel trade gives them a source of revenue that
makes governing easier.
In short, a policy whose ostensible goal was to weaken
Hamas’ hold on Gaza has apparently strengthened it.
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The closure policy has hollowed out the sectors of Gaza
society with ties to Israel and the West Bank, and thus isolated those with a
greater interest in a two-state solution. The policy has also empowered those
with ties to Hamas and to organized crime.
“If I were to write a strategic plan on how to strengthen the Hamas government,” Bashi said, “I would suggest everything Israel has done over the last four years.
Matt Duss, policy analyst at the Center for American
Progress Action Fund, is a regular contributor to Salon. Follow him @mattduss
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