By Dr. Norman D. Livergood
The people of Iceland have demonstrated what citizens of all nations should do:
Reject the fraudulent idea that debts perpetrated by capitalist leaders should be borne by "the people"Arrest and convict capitalist leaders who commit political and economic crimes
Whatever fate befalls Iceland in the
future, its people have provided an example for citizens the world over to
follow.
This is a way forward for the American
political and economic system. As we'll see in the section of this essay on
Iceland's history, Iceland has been controlled and criminally manipulated by a
capitalist junta similar to the American cabal, and is still somewhat under the thumb of this
junta to this day.
Despite, the depredations of the
Icelandic junta, however, Icelandic citizens have been able to elect a number
of more progressive leaders and reject responsibility for Icelandic capitalist
debts.
The people of Iceland twice voted not to repay international debts incurred by banksters, rejecting the idea that "the people" are responsible for bankster debts.
Icelandic citizens held a first
referendum in the spring of 2009 to decide whether the people should pay for
the criminally incurred debts of the banksters and whether their government
could impose these debts on the people without their consent. Ninety-three
percent voted no!
In April of 2011 the Icelandic
citizens held a second referendum to decide whether to accept or reject a
government-concocted agreement negotiated between Iceland, the Netherlands and
the UK to pay back the British and Dutch governments for the money they spent
to recompense savers with the failed Icesave bank. Covering the debt would have
cost Iceland's 317,000 citizens around $17,000 each. Again, they voted to
reject the capitalist "agreement;" this time by close to sixty
percent (58.9%).
This
rejection of the bankster "agreement" was highly significant since current
European governments, pressured by speculators such as Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan
Chase, the IMF, and the European Commission were calling for the imposition of
austerity measures on Icelandic citizens, for which they had not voted.
After
the second Icelandic referendum, even the pro-capitalist Financial Times
on 4/13/2011 had to acknowledge that Icelandic citizens had voted to "put
citizens before banks."
To see how and why all this transpired
in Iceland, we need to review what capitalist atrocities they had experienced.
The economic terrorism visited upon Icelandic citizens is essentially the same
as that suffered by American and other citizens throughout the world.
ICELAND'S HISTORY
"After more than 600 years of
foreign rule, Iceland's social structure was the most feudal of all Nordic
countries at the beginning of the 20th century. Fishing dominated the economy,
generating most of the foreign-currency earnings and allowing the development
of an import-based commercial sector. This created urban economic activities:
construction, services, and light industry.
“After the Second World War the
economy grew strongly, because of Marshall Plan aid (there was a large US-Nato
military base); an abundant export commodity, cold-water fish, unusually
blessed with high income elasticity of demand; and a small, literate population
with a strong sense of national identity.
"There
is a direct line of descent from the quasi-feudal power structures of the 19th
century to the modernized Icelandic capitalism of the later 20th century, when blocs
of 14 families, popularly known as The Octopus, were the economic and political
ruling elite. The Octopus controlled imports, transport, banking, insurance,
fishing and supplies to the Nato base and provided most top politicians. The
families lived like chieftains.
"The
Octopus controlled the rightwing Independence Party (IP) which dominated the
media and decided on senior appointments in the civil service, police and
judiciary. The local, state-owned banks were effectively run by the dominant
parties, the IP and the Centre Party or CP. Ordinary people had to go through
party functionaries to get loans to buy a car, or for foreign exchange for
travel abroad. Power networks operated as webs of bullying, sycophancy and
distrust, permeated with a macho culture, something like the former Soviet
Union.
"This
traditional order was challenged from within by a neoliberal faction, the
Locomotive group, which had coalesced in the early 1970s after law and business
administration students at the University of Iceland took over a journal, The
Locomotive, and promoted free-market ideas. Their aim was not just to
transform the society but also to open career opportunities for themselves,
rather than wait for Octopus patronage. At the end of the cold war their
position strengthened materially and ideologically, as the communists and
social democrats lost public support. The future IP prime minister, David
Oddsson, was a prominent member.
"Oddsson,
born in 1948 with a middle-class background, was elected as an IP councilor to
the Reykjavik municipal council in 1974; by 1982 he was mayor of Reykjavik,
leading privatization campaigns, including selling off the municipality's
fishing industry, to the benefit of members of the Locomotive group. In 1991 he
led the IP to victory in the general election, and reigned (not too strong a
word) as prime minister for 14 years, overseeing the growth of the financial
sector, before installing himself as governor of the Central Bank in 2004.
He had little experience or interest in the world beyond Iceland. His Locomotive group protégé Geir Haarde, finance minister from 1998 to 2005, took over as prime minister shortly after. These two men most directly steered Iceland's great experiment to create an international financial centre in the North Atlantic, midway between Europe and America.
.
He had little experience or interest in the world beyond Iceland. His Locomotive group protégé Geir Haarde, finance minister from 1998 to 2005, took over as prime minister shortly after. These two men most directly steered Iceland's great experiment to create an international financial centre in the North Atlantic, midway between Europe and America.
.
"The
liberalization of the economy began in 1994, when accession to the European
Economic Area, the free-trade bloc of EU countries, plus Iceland, Lichtenstein
and Norway, lifted restrictions on cross-border flows of capital, goods,
services and people. The Oddsson government then sold off state-owned assets
and deregulated labour. Privatization began in 1998, implemented by Oddsson and
Halldor Asgrimsson, the leader of the CP. Of the banks, Landsbanki was
allocated to IP grandees, Kaupthing to their counterparts in the CP, its
coalition partner; foreign bidders were excluded. Later, Glitnir, a private
bank formed from the merger of several smaller ones, joined the league.
"So
Iceland roared into international finance aided globally by abundant cheap
credit and free capital mobility, and domestically by strong political backing
for the banks. The new banks merged investment banking with commercial banking,
so that both shared government guarantees. And the country had low sovereign
debt, which gave the banks high marks from the international credit-rating
agencies. The major shareholders of Landsbanki, Kaupthing, Glitnir and their
spin-offs reversed the earlier political dominance of finance: government
policy was now subordinated to the ends of finance.
"Oddsson
and friends relaxed the state-provided mortgage rules, allowing 90% loans. The
newly privatized banks rushed to offer even more generous terms. Income tax and
VAT rates were lowered to turn Iceland into a low-tax international financial
centre. Bubble dynamics took hold. City planners aimed to move Reykjavik from
the trajectory of an ordinary city to that of a world city (despite its small
population of 110,000) and approved several grandiose new public and private
buildings, saying "If Dubai, why not Reykjavik?"
"Iceland's
new banking elite were intent on expanding their ownership of the economy,
competing and cooperating with each other. Using their shares as collateral,
some took out large loans from their own banks, and bought more shares in the
same banks, inflating share prices. It worked like this: Bank A lent to
shareholders in Bank B, who bought more shares in B using shares as collateral,
raising B's share price. Bank B returned the favour. The share prices of both
banks rose, without new money coming in. The banks not only grew bigger, they
grew more and more interconnected. Several dealings of this kind are now under
criminal investigation by the special prosecutor, as cases of market
manipulation.
.
.
"Tiny
Iceland soon managed to enter the big-bank league, with three banks in the world's
biggest 300 by 2006. The super-abundance of credit allowed people to consume in
extravagant celebration of their escape from the earlier decades of credit
rationing (on top of the earlier escape from foreign rule as recently as 1944).
“They
saw themselves as fully independent at last, which may explain their happiness
ranking. The owners and managers remunerated themselves on an ever-larger
scale. The richer they were, the more they attracted political support. Their
private jets, roaring in and out of Reykjavik's airport, seemed to be visual
and auditory proof to the part-admiring, part-envious population below.
Income and wealth inequality surged, helped by government policies that shifted the tax burden to the poorer population. The bankers made large financial contributions to the governing parties and giant loans to key politicians. The leading Icelandic champion of free-market economics declared in The Wall Street Journal: "Oddsson's experiment with liberal policies is the greatest success story in the world."
.
Income and wealth inequality surged, helped by government policies that shifted the tax burden to the poorer population. The bankers made large financial contributions to the governing parties and giant loans to key politicians. The leading Icelandic champion of free-market economics declared in The Wall Street Journal: "Oddsson's experiment with liberal policies is the greatest success story in the world."
.
"In
the euphoria, the dangers of a strategy of "economic growth based on vast
foreign borrowing" were overlooked. Icelanders lived out the dictum of
Plautus, the third century BC Roman playwright, who had one of his characters
declare: 'I am a rich man, as long as I do not repay my creditors.'
"In
2006 there were worries in the financial press about the stability of the big
banks, which were beginning to have problems raising funds in the money markets
(on which their business model depended). Iceland's current account deficit had
soared from 5% of GDP in 2003 to 20% in 2006, one of the highest in the world.
The stock market multiplied itself nine times over between 2001 and 2007.
"Landsbanki,
Kaupthing and Glitnir were operating far beyond the capacity of Iceland's
Central Bank to support them as lender of last resort; their liabilities were
real, but many of their assets were dubious. In February 2006 Fitch downgraded
Iceland's outlook from stable to negative and triggered the 2006 'mini-crisis':
the krona fell sharply, the value of banks' liabilities in foreign currencies
rose, the stock market fell and business defaults rose, and the sustainability
of foreign-currency debts became a public problem, The Danske Bank of
Copenhagen described Iceland as a "geyser economy" on the point of
exploding.
"The lesson here is instructive across the pond, but it is a chilling one. If the U.S. ~ or any sovereign for that matter ~ attempts to restructure their debts, or to force private investors to take a haircut on their own foolish gambles, these international institutions have promised the equivalent of economic war in response. However, the alternative is for representative governments to sacrifice their independence to a cadre of faceless bankers who share no allegiance to any nation."It is the conflict that has already defined the beginning of the 21st Century. The question is whether free peoples will choose to remain free, as Iceland has, or to submit." ~ Source
"Icelandic bankers and politicians brushed aside the crisis. Iceland's
Central Bank took out a loan to double the foreign-exchange reserves, while the
Chamber of Commerce, run by representatives of Landsbanki, Kaupthing, Glitnir
and their spin-offs, responded with a PR campaign. It paid the American
monetary economist Frederic Mishkin $135,000 to lend his name to a report
attesting to the stability of Iceland's banks. It allegedly paid the London
Business School economist Richard Portes £58,000 ($95,000) to do the same for a
later report. The supply-side economist Arthur Laffer assured the Icelandic
business community in 2007 that fast economic growth with a large trade deficit
and ballooning foreign debt were signs of success: 'Iceland should be a model
to the world.' The value of the banks' 'assets' was then around eight times
greater than Iceland's GDP.
"In the elections of May 2007,
the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA) entered a coalition government with the
still-dominant IP. To the consternation of many supporters, SDA leaders ditched
their pre-election pledges and endorsed the continued expansion of the
financial sector.
"Though they had survived 2006,
Landsbanki, Kaupthing and Glitnir had trouble raising money to fund their asset
purchases and repay existing debts, largely denominated in foreign currencies.
So Landsbanki pioneered Icesave, an internet-based service that aimed to win
retail savings deposits by offering more attractive interest rates than
high-street banks. Established in Britain in October 2006 and in the
Netherlands 18 months later, Icesave caught the attention of best buy internet
finance sites and was soon flooded with deposits. Millions of pounds arrived
from Cambridge University, the London Metropolitan Police Authority, even the
UK Audit Commission, responsible for overseeing local government funds, as well
as 300,000 Icesave depositors in the UK alone.
"Icesave entities were legally
established as branches, rather than subsidiaries, so they were under the
supervision of the Icelandic authorities, rather than their hosts. No one
noticed that the Icelandic regulatory agency had a total staff, including
receptionist, of only 45 and suffered high turnover as many went on to join the
banks, which offered better pay. No one worried much that, because of Iceland's
obligations as a member of the EEA deposit insurance scheme, its population of
320,000 would be responsible for compensating the depositors abroad in the
event of failure. Landsbanki's shareholders reaped the short-term profits while
most Icelanders didn't know anything about Icesave at all.
.
.
"The second 'solution' to
difficulties in raising new funds was a way to get more access to liquidity
without pledging real assets as collateral. The Big Three sold debt securities
to a smaller regional bank, which took these bonds to the Central Bank and
borrowed against them, without having to supply further collateral; they then
lent back to the initiating big bank. The bonds were called 'love letters' ~
mere promises. By participating in this game and accepting as collateral claims
on other Icelandic banks the central bank was conniving in the banks' strategy
of gambling for resurrection.
"Then the banks internationalized
the process: the Big Three established subsidiaries in Luxembourg and sold love
letters to them. The subsidiaries sold them on to the Central Bank of
Luxembourg or the European Central Bank and received cash in return, which they
could pass back to the parent bank in Iceland or use themselves. The OECD
calculates that just the domestic love letters, between the CBI and the
Icelandic banks, incurred losses to the CBI and the Treasury of 13% of GDP
(OECD Economic Surveys: Iceland, June 2011).
"The Icelandic banks fell two
weeks after Lehman Brothers. On 29 September 2008, Glitnir approached
Oddsson at the Central Bank for help with its looming liquidity problem. To
restore confidence, Oddsson instructed the Central Bank to buy 75% of Glitnir's
shares. The effect was not to boost Glitnir but to undermine confidence in
Iceland. The country's rating plunged, and credit lines were withdrawn from
Landsbanki and Kaupthing. A run on Icesave's overseas branches began. Oddsson
moved on 7 October 2008 to peg the krona to a basket of currencies at
close to the pre-crisis value.
“With the currency tumbling and in the
absence of capital controls, the foreign-exchange reserves were exhausted: the
peg lasted for only a few hours, just long enough for those in the know to
change their money out of the krona at a much more favourable rate. Inside
sources indicate that billions left the currency in these hours. Then the krona
was floated, and sank. On 8 October the then UK prime minister, Gordon
Brown, froze Landsbanki's UK assets under the anti-terrorism laws. The stock
market, bank bonds, house prices and average income went into free-fall.
"The IMF arrived in Reykjavik in
October 2008 to prepare a crisis-management programme, the first time the Fund
had been called in to rescue a developed economy since Britain in 1976. It
offered a conditional loan of $2.1bn to stabilize the krona and backed the
British and Dutch governments' demands that Iceland should honour the
obligations of the European deposit-guarantee scheme and recompense them for
their bailouts of Icesave depositors.
.
"Iceland's normally placid
population erupted in an angry protest movement, principally targeted at
Haarde, Oddsson and the IP, although the SDA's foreign minister Ingibjorg
Gisladottir was considered tarnished too. Thousands of people assembled in
Reykjavik's main square on freezing Saturday afternoons between October 2008
and January 2009, banged saucepans, linked arms in a circle around the
parliament building to demand the government's resignation, and pelted the
building with food.
"In January 2009, the IP-SDA
coalition broke. To date, Iceland is the only country to have shifted
distinctly to the left after the financial crisis. An interim SDA-LGM (Social
Democrats-Left Green Movement) government was formed in January 2009 to lead until
April's election. In the election the IP was reduced to 16 seats, despite the
overwhelming bias of the electoral system in its favour, its worst result since
its formation in 1929.
"The SDA-LGM government came
under immediate pressure to repay the Icesave debt; much of the IMF loan was
withheld until Reykjavik agreed. The new government was also divided on whether
to apply for full membership of the EU and Eurozone, with most of the SDA
strongly in favour. After long negotiations, the government presented the terms
they had agreed on the Icesave debt to the parliament in October 2009: £5.5bn
($7.8bn), or 50% of Iceland's GDP, was to be paid to the British and Dutch
treasuries between 2016 and 2023.
.
.
"The party's health minister
resigned in protest, five dissidents refused to vote with the government. The
bill was forced through on 30 December 2009, against high feelings in the
country. On 5 January 2010 President Grimsson announced that he would not
sign it into law, out of respect for the national sentiment. In the ensuing
referendum the bill was decisively rejected. In the May 2010 Reykjavik
municipal elections, the SDA slumped to 19% and a comedian was elected as the
city's mayor. In October protests resumed, and the coalition conceded the
election of a constitutional assembly to draw up a new constitution (the
existing one having been inherited from Denmark on independence in 1944). When
the election was invalidated by the Supreme Court, the assembly was reconvened
as a constitutional council appointed by parliament.
"The deal on the table in this
April's second Icesave referendum involved substantial concessions on the part
of the British and Dutch governments. After the no vote, the disagreement may
have to go to international courts.
"The cost of losses on loans and
guarantees, added to the cost of restructuring financial organizations, brings
the total direct fiscal costs of the crisis to about 20% of GDP, higher than in
any other country except Ireland (OECD Economic Surveys, Iceland, June 2011).
But the postponement of major public spending cuts until this year [2011] has
given the economy breathing space; and the sharp devaluation has helped to
generate a trade surplus for the first time in many years.
So far, Iceland has experienced smaller falls in GDP and employment than big public-spending slashers like Ireland, Estonia and Lithuania. The unemployment rate, only 2% in 2006, has been between 7% and 9% since 2009; but the rate of outmigration, of Icelanders and other European workers (predominantly Polish), has been the highest since 1889. However, the SDA-LGM government has announced drastic cuts in public spending for 2011 and beyond. Local governments have no budget for fresh projects. Hospitals and schools are cutting salaries and sacking employees. The freeze on house repossessions expired in 2010.
So far, Iceland has experienced smaller falls in GDP and employment than big public-spending slashers like Ireland, Estonia and Lithuania. The unemployment rate, only 2% in 2006, has been between 7% and 9% since 2009; but the rate of outmigration, of Icelanders and other European workers (predominantly Polish), has been the highest since 1889. However, the SDA-LGM government has announced drastic cuts in public spending for 2011 and beyond. Local governments have no budget for fresh projects. Hospitals and schools are cutting salaries and sacking employees. The freeze on house repossessions expired in 2010.
"The IP-SDA government's decision
to provide unlimited bank deposit guarantees illustrates its debt to the
financial elite. Had it limited the guarantee to 5m krona ($70,000), it would
have protected the entire deposits of 95% of depositors; only the wealthiest
5%, including many politicians, benefited from the unlimited guarantee, which
now means further constraints on public spending.
"Iceland's
tiny scale seemed to make it easier to challenge the government's denial of the
impending crisis, but the opposite was true. The Oddsson government undertook
an extreme privatization of information. Iceland's National Economic Institute
had a reputation for independent thinking, and Oddsson abolished it in 2002.
From then on the banks, international rating companies and the Chamber of
Commerce provided almost the only information and running commentary on the
state of the economy, present and future.
"Paradoxically,
a number of critical reports were published when the bubble was in the early
stages, including one by the CBI. But by 2007-08, when the dangers were acute,
reports, including those by the IMF, became noticeably softer in tone. It seems
that the official financial institutions, as well as bankers and politicians,
understood that the situation was so fragile that just to speak of it might
trigger a run on the banks.
"In
October 2010 the parliament decided to charge Prime Minister Haarde for breach
of ministerial responsibility. The permanent finance secretary Baldur
Gudlaugsson (former member of the Locomotive group) has been given two years in
prison for using inside information for his personal advantage while selling
his shares in Landsbanki in September 2008. But the special prosecutor in
charge of the investigation of the banks has been working with a team of 60
lawyers and others for the past two years and has so far brought no charges.
Meanwhile Oddsson was appointed in September 2009 as editor-in-chief at Morgunbladid,
the leading Iceland daily, and orchestrated coverage of the crisis. A
commentator said that was like appointing Nixon editor of The Washington
Post after Watergate. Iceland's elite looks after its own." 1
CAPITALIST RETALIATION
When a nation such as Iceland goes up against the global capitalist cabal, we can expect it to retaliate in any way possible. As of September, 2011, two cabal retaliatory operations have been launched against Iceland:
2. The current cabal U.S. puppet regime is planning economic sanctions against Iceland, using the excuse of whaling irregularities
LESSONS STILL TO BE LEARNED
The Icelandic example is one of genuine significance: citizens in all countries besieged by international capitalist vultures should refuse to bail them out when their criminal operations threaten the entire economy. But Iceland's example is also one of only partial success:
The Icelandic people failed to extricate themselves from their capitalistic economyThey failed to eradicate their capitalist ruling juntaThey failed to institute a cooperative commonwealth economy for the benefit of all citizens ~ even though their writing a new constitution gave them the perfect opportunity to do so
We
can certainly take an important lesson from what Icelandic citizens have
been able to do. But, in echoes of Lincoln's great address, it is for us to
be dedicated to the unfinished work which the Icelandic people so nobly
advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining
before us--the replacement of fascism and predatory capitalism with a cooperative commonwealth polity that shall initiate a new birth of freedom through
a government of the people, by the people, for the people.
NOTES:
Reference and Updates:
Lessons From Iceland [longer version of the preceding article]
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