Source: The Ugly Truth
July
24, 2013
Over the past
three years, my wife Pennie and I have been working on a documentary film about
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During our second production trip to the
region, one of the many remarkable people we encountered was Uri Davis. He is
one of a handful of Israelis who has built a life for himself among the
Palestinians of the West Bank. This made him a very interesting subject for our
film, which examines the practical and moral failings of the two-state
solution.
During our
interview with Davis, one of the questions we asked was whether he had
encountered any anti-Semitism in the West Bank. The question was motivated by a
desire on our part to address a narrative ~ prevalent among American and
Israeli Jews ~ which claims that anti-Semitism is an obvious feature of
Palestinian culture.
As these two groups are an important part of our target audience, we felt that
it was our responsibility to address this perception. Who better to ask about
the veracity of this narrative than a Jew living among Palestinians?
Davis answered by saying that although Palestinian anti-Semitism does exist, it is a marginal phenomenon, while anti-Arab sentiment among Israelis is a mainstream phenomenon.
Shortly after the interview, it occurred to us
that we could either substantiate or disprove Davis’s provocative statement
with our cameras.
We began our
survey in February 2011 and completed it in early March. On the Israeli side,
we interviewed a total of 250 Jewish Israelis in Haifa, Tel Aviv, Herzliya,
Jerusalem and Beersheba. For this part of the survey I conducted the interviews
myself from behind the camera in Hebrew.
On the
Palestinian side, we interviewed a total of 250 Palestinians in Jenin, Nablus,
Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron. (Despite multiple attempts, we were unable to
procure permission to enter the Gaza Strip.) Here, we collaborated with local
journalist Mohammad Jaradat who, using my questions, conducted the interviews
in Arabic.
The questions we
asked pertained to a number of sensitive political topics and the idea was to
get people to talk long enough to detect if there was any racism at play in
their answers. In sociological terms, we were engaged in qualitative analysis,
but unlike typical qualitative interviews, we spent minutes, not hours with our
subjects.
Our survey is not
exhaustive and our method was very simple. We went to public places and asked
people to talk to us on camera. In designing the questions, I set out to
distinguish actual racism from conflict-based animosity. That is, to allow for
the possibility that Israelis might exhibit animosity towards Palestinians
without being racist and to allow the same on the Palestinian side in reverse.
The very first
question we asked of Jewish Israelis was the extremely broad “What do you think
about Arabs?” It is only reasonable to expect that people who harbour anti-Arab
sentiment would mask their feelings when answering such a direct question on
camera. Most people responded to this question with some variation of “They are
people,” although we were surprised that a sizable minority used the
opportunity to launch into anti-Arab diatribes.
One of the most
disturbing trends that we noticed was the strong correlation between age and
anti-Arab sentiment. The majority of Israeli teenagers that we spoke to
expressed unabashed and open racism towards Arabs. Statements like “I hate
them,” or “They should all be killed” were common in this age group.
When looking over
the data, we divided the respondents into three groups: those who were neutral
about Arabs; those who were positive about them; and those who expressed
negative attitudes. Amongst the responses, 60 percent were neutral, 25 percent
negative and 15 percent positive.
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Rights
misunderstood
Interestingly,
some of the same people who answered the first question by saying that Arabs
are people, went on to say that they wouldn’t be willing to live next door to
them. Internal inconsistencies of this nature cropped up in many of the
interviews and it is for this reason that we reserved our overall judgment on
the prevalence of anti-Arab sentiment until all of the answers were tabulated.
Our results show that 71 percent were willing to live next door to Arab neighbours,
while 24 percent were unwilling. Five percent failed to answer this question
with either a “yes” or a “no.”
It should be
noted that the Israel Democracy Institute received dramatically different numbers
in response to the above question. In its 2010 survey, it found that 46 percent
of Jewish Israelis were unwilling to live next door to an Arab. The implication
of this discrepancy is that our survey sample was much less anti-Arab than the
population at large.
When it came to
equal rights, a clear majority of our respondents answered that they felt it
was important for Arab citizens of the state of Israel to enjoy equal rights.
Upon review of the data, one of the significant trends that emerged in these
answers was the recurrent use of the phrase “rights and responsibilities.”
Many people openly resented the fact that most Arab citizens of the state don’t perform military service and argued that Arabs should only have equal rights if they are held to the same responsibilities as Jews.
This response
demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of the very concept of rights, but it
was prevalent enough that we felt it justified its own category. We called this
category “conditional.” Of these responses, 64 percent were in favour of equal
rights, 16 percent were opposed and 20 percent were in favour of conditional
rights.
Once again, we
saw a clear discrepancy from the Israel Democracy Institute numbers, which
showed that 46 percent of Israelis were opposed to full and equal rights for
Arab citizens of the state.
.
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Democracy
for Jews only?
Israel defines
itself as a “Jewish democracy” but we were interested in discovering which part
of that definition is more important to Jewish Israelis. We went about doing
this by asking:
“What’s more important: that Israel be a Jewish state or a democratic state?”
What we
discovered was that a clear majority of the people we spoke to felt that the
Jewish character of the state was at least equally if not more important than
the democratic character. There was, however, an impressive minority who were
clear about the fact that it was more important to them that Israel be a
democratic state. This last category represents, by a slim margin, the single
largest group of our respondents: 37 percent felt that a democratic character
was more important, 36 percent felt that a Jewish character was more important
and 27 percent felt that both were equally important.
On the subject of
the settlers,
we asked a more leading question:
“What do you think about the settlers? Are they an impediment to peace?”
We broke the
responses down into three groups: those who were neutral about the settlers;
those who were positive about them; and those who expressed negativity. In this
instance, answering “yes” was taken as evidence of negative feelings towards
the settlers, answering “no” without qualification was taken as a neutral
stance and answering “no” followed by something like “they are the heroes of
the Jewish people” ~ a phrase that we heard a number of times ~ was taken as
evidence of positive feelings. What we discovered was that more than 70 percent
of the people we spoke to were either neutral or positive towards the settlers.
Of the responses, 45 percent were neutral, 28 percent were positive and 27
percent were negative about the settlers.
ED Noor: Remember that these are the folks who have made a shrine of the grave of mass murderer Baruch Goldstein and who award their bloodiest soldiers for services rendered. So of course there would be admiration for these settlers in this rogue nation.
Many of the
people we spoke to exhibited a deep suspicion and mistrust of the Palestinian
people. When asked whether it was possible to make peace with the Palestinians,
less than half of our respondents answered “yes.” This is a sobering statistic
for anyone invested in the peace process.
It would seem
that most of the people we spoke to have given up on the prospect of peace.
Even among the Israelis who believed that peace is possible, a recurrent theme
was “not in this generation.”
Another important
trend in this part of the survey was blaming the Palestinian leadership for the
lack of progress in the peace process. Many of the people who answered “yes”
stated that peace was possible with the Palestinian people but not with their
leaders. Of the responses, 48 percent believed that peace with the Palestinians
is possible, while 40 percent felt that peace is not possible. Thirteen percent
failed to answer this question with either a “yes” or a “no.”
Little
knowledge of one-state solution
Given the subject
of our film, we were very interested in exploring people’s preferences for
potential solutions to the conflict. What we noticed almost immediately was that
it was very important to clarify to our respondents exactly what we meant by
one state or two states. For the purposes of our survey, we defined the
one-state solution as a secular democracy with equal rights on all of historic
Palestine, while we defined the two-state solution as two states more or less
along the lines of the 1967 boundaries, with East Jerusalem as the capital of
the Palestinian state. It was important that we were able to explain exactly
what we meant, because many Israelis answered one way but meant something
entirely different.
For example, when
asked whether they preferred the one-state solution or the two-state solution,
many respondents answered that they preferred the two-state solution. But when
we followed up and asked what territorial concessions they would be willing to
make, these same people said that they wouldn’t agree to any concessions.
Furthermore,
almost no one that we spoke to was familiar with the concept of the one-state
solution. Many people even took this to mean one state for Jews only, until we
clarified our meaning.
When we reviewed
the data from this section of the survey, we decided to break down the
responses into seven different categories: one state; one state (i.e. a state
for Jews only); two states; two states (i.e. without territorial concessions);
either one or two states; neither one nor two states; and other.
What is really
fascinating about our results is that over two thirds of the people we spoke to
were actively opposed to the classic two-state solution on the 1967 borders.
Furthermore, there were almost as many true one-state solution supporters as
there were classic two-state supporters.
Amongst those we
surveyed, 27 percent were true two-state supporters, 23 percent were true one
state supporters, 22 percent supported neither, 16 percent were in favour of
two states without territorial concessions, 6 percent were okay with either one
or two states, 4 percent were in favour of one state for Jews only, and 2
percent didn’t fit into any of these categories.
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Racism
highest in Jerusalem
In trying to
answer the question of whether anti-Arab sentiment is a mainstream phenomenon
among Israelis, we looked at all of the answers and divided the data into three
categories: not anti-Arab; mildly anti-Arab; and strongly anti-Arab.
Once again, we
allowed for the possibility that a person might exhibit animosity towards
Palestinians without being anti-Arab and we did not put people into one of the
anti-Arab columns simply because he or she expressed right-wing political
views. So, for example, if the only evidence in an interview of anti-Arab
sentiment was that the respondent said that equal rights for Arabs are
conditional upon equal responsibilities, we did not put them in an anti-Arab
column. However, if a respondent stated that they wouldn’t live next door to an
Arab, this was sufficient to push him or her into the mildly anti-Arab column.
To qualify for the strongly anti-Arab category, a respondent needed to exhibit
anti-Arab sentiment in two or more answers.
Our results
showed that 46 percent of our respondents were either mildly or strongly
anti-Arab. When we broke these numbers down according to city, there were
obvious regional differences. Jerusalem was by far the most anti-Arab of the
five cities we visited, with 58 percent exhibiting some level of anti-Arab
sentiment, while Haifa was the least with 32 percent. Interestingly, after
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv was the city with the most anti-Arab sentiment (49
percent).
The data we gathered substantiates the idea that anti-Arab sentiment is a mainstream phenomenon in Israel.
Almost half of
all the Jewish Israelis we spoke to exhibited some level of anti-Arab
sentiment. The single most disturbing trend that emerged was the correlation
between youth and strong anti-Arab sentiment.
We also learned
that support for the classic two-state solution along the 1967 lines was very
low among the people we spoke to. This data point
was reinforced by the strong support that we saw for the settlers.
Given our leading
question, the fact that less than a third of respondents were willing to
characterize the settlers as an impediment to peace, is further evidence that
the two-state solution, as it is currently being proposed by the international
community, is decidedly unpopular in Israel.
Despite the lack
of knowledge about the one-state solution idea, some respondents appeared
willing to consider it. Once this solution was explained to them, 22 percent
preferred it and around 6 percent did not object to it. Finally, when we asked
Jewish Israelis to choose between the Jewish character of the state and the
democratic character, 36 percent opted for the latter. All of these results
must be taken with a grain of salt.
We can report
anecdotally that many of the people who refused to be interviewed told us that
they wouldn’t participate, because they felt that we were part of the “leftist
media.” For these reasons, we feel that it is likely, if anything, that our
data underestimates the actual amount of anti-Arab sentiment in Israel.
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