A PRO-NUCLEAR CORPORATE PRESS
I've had enough of reading things
Check it over then ask yourself what are the chances these outlets will give you the honest truth about the state of affairs in ANYTHING GE is even remotely involved in from wars to nuclear power. What are the chances? My bet would be, slim to none.
Cable: NBC Entertainment, NBC News, NBC Sports, NBC Television, NBC Universal, CNBC, CNBC World (Arabia, India, Asia, Europe), MSNBC, Bravo, SyFy Channel, Telemundo, USA, Oxygen, Weather Plus, Mun2, Sleuth, Chiller, Universal HD, A&E Networks (16%; includes A&E, the History Channel, History en español, the Biography Channel, Military History Channel, Crime & Investigation Network, A&E HD, the History Channel HD, History International), the Weather Channel (partial), SyFy Channel HD.
Production and distribution companies: NBC Universal Television Distribution, Universal Media Studios
26 television stations, owned under the “NBC Universal” division. These include NBC affiliates, 46 stations, Telemundo affiliates, and a small number of independents.
International Channels: 13eme Rue (France), 13th Street (Germany), Studio Universal (Germany), Sci-fi Channel (Germany), Calle 13 (Spain), Sci Fi Channel UK, Movies 24 (UK), DivaTV (UK), Studio Universal (Italy), Universal Channel (Latin America), CNBC Asia, CNBC Europe, 18 Hallmark Channels (worldwide), KidsCo (worldwide, partial).
Programming: NBC Network News, NBC Universal Global Networks, NBC Universal International Channels, The Today Show, NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams, Dateline NBC, Meet the Press, Early Today, CNBC, Squawk Box, Mad Money, CNBC World, CNBC Arabia, CNBC-India TV-18, Hardball with Chris Matthews, the Rita Cosby Specials Unit, Morning Joe, Mun2, Sleuth, A&E [partial], the History Channel [partial], the Biography Channel (partial), ShopNBC (27%).
Distribution: Universal Studios Home Entertainment.
Parks: Universal Studios Theme Parks and Resorts (Orlando, FL; Hollywood, CA; Costa Durada, Spain; Universal City, Japan)
Consumer Products: NBC Stores, ShopNBC (partial), GE Industrial (Formerly, GE Consumer and Industrial), AETN Consumer Products (37.5% equity).
GE Consumer & Industrial (appliances, lighting, and Industrial Systems).
June 19, 2011
However, the prophetic warnings advanced in this writing have now come true, although the nuclear “accident” did not occur on North American soil, but in Fukushima Japan ~ a surrogate client state of the United States and its national security apparatus and weapons complex ~ and a corporate ally in nuclear proliferation and global radioactive destruction.
It is now confirmed that there are three reactors at the Fukushima complex that melted THROUGH their outer containment vessels, through ALL the layers of so-called “defense-in-depth” and are continuing to spew lethal nuclear poisons and further contaminate the land we live on, the air we breathe, and the water that sustains all life on earth.
At Fukushima, and all over Japan ~ and with deadly nuclear poisons spreading all over the world ~ it’s much worse than you think.
How close am I to the nearest reactor?
What level of emergency preparedness and evaluation procedures is currently practiced there?
What are the origins of my perceptions and beliefs about nuclear power?
How do “market forces” manifest themselves in the media’s coverage of nuclear power?
Question: Is there precedence for institutionalized deception?
Answer: What is the nature of deception exercised by the tobacco industry? Are such deceptions inherent to tobacco interests alone?
How can I ~ and how should I ~ evaluate and verify the integrity (safety) or compromise (threat) inherent in nuclear power operations?
“Despite every design and operation precaution taken by us,” he said, “we have experienced leaks in some of our steam generators… we had to spend considerable time and money on a brute-force approach, because there was no hope of obtaining an understanding of the fundamentals involved in a reasonable length of time.”
“the consequences of a very large reactor accident at a hypothetically small nuclear plant near a large city” at 43,000 injuries, 3,400 deaths and seven billion dollars in 1957 losses. And, because of this, the U.S. Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act indemnifying the industry from economic liability.[The Price-Anderson Act was originally known as the 'Gore Bill', because it was introduced by Senator Albert Gore Sr., and this, indeed, is an inconvenient truth.] The McKinney Commission (1957) argues against “the rush to construct nuclear power plants just for us to look at, brag about and subsidize.”
When plants ordered in 1963 came on line in 1969, there were 91 plants on order; and by 1972, there were 162. All of the 107 nuclear plants in operation in the U.S. today deploy technology of this era. [There are 103 reactors operating in the U.S. at present.]
“Engineers involved in designing these plants [got] their experience mainly from marine [steam] power plants where everything was relatively small,” he confirmed [in a personal interview]. “In essence, they merely scaled plants up from what they knew before.”
At least thirteen utilities sued Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering, alleging SGT fraud. Suits are settled out-of-court, with documents sealed against public scrutiny.
Technological innovation is not achieved by “brute-force” or “make it work” engineering, but all evidence reveals that the pace of nuclear development exceeded the human capacity for innovation.
Modeled after the reactors of Rickover’s nuclear navy, driven by the race to beat the Russians, to meet boom-or-bust sales worldwide, by economic optimism but unverified science, and forced to compete with an entrenched fossil fuel economy, nuclear power technology was virtually stillborn.
Pervasive and systemic aging degradation ~ like metal fatigue, structural embrittlement, corrosive water chemistry, and neutron bombardment ~ has been institutionalized by NRC and industry complacency and arrogance.
Parameters have been altered, designs modified, upgrades creatively and casually implemented.
Multiple modifications have spawned multiple blueprints ~ often outdated, poorly modified, and unavailable in an emergency (e.g. Three Mile Island).
There have been countless license modifications with their many justifications, but only mock attention to detail and procedure.
“Every modification due to some problem,” says Paul Gunter of the Nuclear Information Resource Services, “constitutes an erosion in the design margins of safety.”
“utilities operating at least 72 of the 113 domestic nuclear power plants have installed or are suspected of having received nonconforming products.”
And too, there are the thousands of valves, plugs, pumps, motors, relays, switches, gauges, air ejectors, ducts, conduits, valve seals, grommets, electrical cables, switchboards, alarms, diesel generators, electrical buses, penetrations, inverters, resistors, turbines, condensers, transformers, nozzles, fuses, nuts, bolts and welds which have failed ~ fallen out, corroded, short-circuited, melted, disintegrated, fractured or stuck ~ under various circumstances.
Initial conditions, specifications and assumptions chosen or argued to insure safe operation no longer apply. Engineers and scientists, for the most part, operate in their own little areas of specialization.
“biased by the customs of their disciplines or by the accidental paths of their own educations.”
Utilities are minimizing reactor outages and maximizing operations at the expense of safety.
Reliability and quality assurance testing of back-up safety systems have been relaxed, postponed or eliminated completely. Optimizing economic factors, Houston Light & Power (TX) recently broke industry records for a refueling outage.
The intensity of irradiation prohibits or restricts access and in-service testing of systems and components.
The concomitant shift to on-line maintenance means that so-called “redundant” safety systems ~ ever touted as the backbone of “defense-in-depth” ~ are disabled during full-power reactor operations.
Economic imperatives are dictating patchwork repairs in lieu of expensive parts replacements.
[This is exactly what happened at Fukushima: reactor operators and the TEPCO management delayed triage actions out of the fear of economic losses; once they did react ~ dumping saltwater on the molten reactor cores ~ it was too little, too much uncertainty, too late]
Employees legitimately concerned about safety, improper procedures or the cutting of nuclear corners, are not free to speak without fear of retaliation: The NRC has persistently betrayed “whistleblower” security ~ and punished nuclear whistleblowers.
While some utilities may appear to cling in desperation to our entrenched but obsolete and unprofitable nuclear economy, evidence also suggests that executives shielded by the Price-Anderson Act consider themselves impervious to the consequences of reactor failure.
It should also be acknowledged that radioactive remediation has become a billion dollar industry unto itself.
Journalists [and the corporate propaganda system that pays them] predominantly ignore such nuclear conundrums as safety, unprofitability, waste accumulation, unlawful decommissioning, routine radioactive releases, or the epidemics of disease clustered around nuclear sites.
[Not to mention the economic and political ramifications leading us to complete societal breakdown.]
“It appears that there are enormous differences of opinion as to the probability of failure with a loss” of equipment or human life,” he wrote. “Estimates range from roughly one in 100 to one in 100,000. The higher figures come from working engineers and the very low figures from management. What are the causes and consequences of this lack of agreement? What is the cause of management’s fantastic faith in machinery?”
“acceptance and success cannot be taken as evidence of safety. Failures are not what the design expected. They are warnings that something is wrong. The equipment is not operating as expected, and therefore there is a danger that it can operate with even wider deviations in this unexpected and not thoroughly understood way. The fact that this danger did not lead to a catastrophe before is no guarantee that it will not the next time.”
“The O-rings of the Solid Rocket Boosters were not designed to erode,” wrote Feynman, in “Personal Observations on Reliability of the Shuttle,” a brief but profound statement buried in Appendix F of Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident.
“Erosion was a clue that something was wrong,” Feynman concluded, not something from which safety can be inferred … For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.” Disregarding structural constraints and systemic defects, GE has pushed output power levels to five percent above the maximum specification ratings of the original design.